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Over the past decades or so the probabilistic model of rational belief has enjoyed
increasing interest from researchers in epistemology and the philosophy of science.
Of course, such probabilistic models were used for much longer in economics, in
game theory, and in other disciplines concerned with decision making. Moreover,
Carnap and co-workers used probability theory to explicate philosophical notions of
confirmation and induction, thereby targeting epistemic rather than decision-
theoretic aspects of rationality. However, following Carnap’s early applications,
philosophy has more recently seen an increased popularity of probabilistic models
in other areas concerned with the philosophical analysis of belief: there are models
targeting coherence, informativeness, simplicity, and so on.
In brief, the probabilistic model of belief comprises of a language, detailing the
propositions about which an agent is supposed to have beliefs, and a function over
the language that expresses beliefs: the strength of a belief in a proposition is
expressed by means of a probability, i.e., a real number between 0 and 1, assigned to
that probability. The model offers several rules on how to revise beliefs, of which
Bayes’ rule is the most prominent. It will not come as a surprise that philosophers
have enquired into the adequacy of this model, as a means of representing the
various concerns and positions in their debate. The philosophical analysis of belief
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offers subtle distinctions and categories, and it is by no means clear that the
probabilistic model is versatile enough to accommodate all of these.
Indeed, the model has a number of fixities. One very important limitation is that
the language in which beliefs are expressed, is not amenable to revisions. This
would involve setting up a new probabilistic model. Another important limitation is
that the model automatically constrains probability assignments to comply to logical
relations between propositions. But that is at odds with how rational agents deal
with logical relations: being rational does not entail that one is logically omniscient.
For present purposes, however, the central shortcoming of the probabilistic
model is that, at first sight at least, it cannot express the epistemic state of radical
uncertainty. With the notion of radical uncertainty we might mean a number of
things. For one, we could be referring to a state of utter cluelessness, in which we
have no language to express what we are uncertain about. We can also mean a state
of, what may be called, model uncertainty, in which we doubt our modelling
assumptions but have insufficient means in the model to express alternative
assumptions. And radical uncertainty may refer to an epistemic state in which we
have insufficient grasp of our uncertainty regarding a distinct set of propositions.
All these notions of radical uncertainty are in some sense under scrutiny in the
current special issue. There are papers by Richard Bradley and Mareile Drechsler,
by Jon Williamson, by Jake Chandler, by Seamus Bradley and Katie Steele, and by
Arthur Paul Pedersen and Gregory Wheeler, in that order. The first paper, by
Bradley and Drechsler, tackles the issue of radical uncertainty directly. They
consider a variety of types of uncertainty that go beyond ‘‘empirical uncertainty’’,
i.e., the one usually expressed in terms of probability. They show how these other
types of uncertainty cannot, without further costs in severity, be captured by the
usual probabilistic model. This paper offers an attractive overview of issues brought
on by radical uncertainty.
To express radical uncertainty of a particular kind, we might employ so-called
imprecise probability assignments: rather than a single, sharp probability function
over the propositions at hand, our uncertainty can be expressed by a set of such
probability functions. The papers by Williamson and Chandler concern, roughly
speaking, the question of how we might motivate sharp or imprecise probability
functions as expressions of belief. Williamson considers how we can motivate sharp
values for our probability assignments in order to put a stop to a regress into ever
higher orders of uncertainty. He finds—perhaps unsurprisingly—that objective
Bayesianism holds the best promise for a proper motivation of that. Chandler’s
paper, by contrast, criticizes an argument in favour of representing uncertainty by
means of sharp probability values, showing that it is based on an unnecessarily strict
principle concerning rational choice.
The last two papers of this issue are devoted to an analysis of a phenomenon that
troubles the use of imprecise probability assignments as representations of belief:
dilation. The challenging version of this phenomenon is that a sharp probability
assignment to a proposition might be updated to an imprecise one, possibly
spanning the full range from 0 to 1, upon learning any one of the elements from an
information partition that seemingly bears no relevance to the proposition in
question. Bradley and Steele investigate several resolutions to this problem,
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exploring variations on how probability assignments are updated upon learning new
information, and considering restrictions on prior probability assignments that help
to avoid dilation altogether. Pedersen and Wheeler, finally, approach the phenom-
enon of dilation from a more mathematical angle. They distinguish between proper
and improper dilation, and trace the phenomenon back to particular failures of
stochastic independence among propositions. They thereby defuse the more
spectacular instances of dilation, and make a case for accepting the less spectacular
versions as a fact of epistemic life.
Taken together, the five papers in this special issue offer a good view of current
philosophical work on how to represent uncertainty. One view that all the authors
seem to share is that imprecise probability assignments present a serious alternative
to the standard probabilistic model of belief. We believe that formal approaches to
epistemology and philosophy of science will, in the next few decades, benefit
greatly from imprecise probabilism. The cult following that imprecise probabilists
have had in the past might well develop into popular philosophical culture.
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